A Syrian-European Return and Reconstruction Fund
Europe Can Spend Less on Managing Displacement by Investing More in Syria’s Recovery
By Dr. Mohammad Mohammad Mazhar Ahmad
Political Researcher and Strategic Expert
For more than a decade, Europe has managed the consequences of Syria’s displacement crisis. Perhaps it is now time to change the question.
Instead of asking, “How can Europe return Syrians?”, policymakers in Berlin, Brussels and Damascus should ask:
How can return become economically viable, socially sustainable and beneficial to Syrians, Syria and Europe alike?
This is no longer only a humanitarian question. It is also an economic, fiscal and strategic one.
From Managing Displacement to Investing in Return
Germany alone still hosts a large Syrian population. Official German statistics recorded approximately 936,000 Syrian nationals in the country at the end of 2025, although totals vary depending on the statistical definition used.
At the same time, Germany’s federal expenditure related to migration and asylum amounted to approximately €24.8 billion in 2025 across all nationalities.
It would be methodologically wrong simply to divide this figure by the number of Syrians and call the result “the cost of a Syrian refugee”. Much of this spending covers broader migration, integration and administrative policies.
But the figure demonstrates something important: Europe already spends substantial resources managing displacement.
The question is whether part of those resources could gradually be redirected from managing the consequences of displacement in Europe to addressing the conditions that prevent sustainable return to Syria.
The Reconstruction Gap
The World Bank estimates the cost of reconstructing Syria’s damaged physical assets at approximately $216 billion.
Of this, roughly $82 billion is required for infrastructure, $75 billion for housing and $59 billion for non-residential buildings.
Against this scale of destruction, the European Union’s announced €620 million package for Syria for 2026–2027 is welcome, but clearly insufficient to transform the economic conditions determining whether Syrians can return.
A refugee does not sustainably return to a financial grant.
A family returns to a home, a job, a functioning school, healthcare, electricity, water, security and the rule of law.
Europe’s return policy and Syria’s reconstruction policy should therefore become part of the same economic architecture.
A €12 Billion Syrian-European Fund
I propose the creation of a:
Syrian-European Return and Reconstruction Fund (SERRF)
with an initial target capitalization of €12 billion over five years, equivalent to €2.4 billion annually.
The entire €12 billion should not come from European taxpayers.
A possible financing structure would combine:
€4 billion from the European Union and participating European governments;
€3 billion in long-term financing from the European Investment Bank and international development institutions;
€3 billion in private-sector investment and investment guarantees;
and €2 billion from international institutions, Arab development funds, Syrian investors and the Syrian diaspora.
The purpose would not be to finance consumption.
It would be to create productive assets that remain in Syria long after the return programme ends.
The 40–25–20–10–5 Formula
The fund could allocate its resources according to a transparent formula:
40 per cent — €4.8 billion: electricity, water, sanitation, transport, municipal infrastructure and services in areas receiving returnees.
25 per cent — €3 billion: housing rehabilitation, affordable housing and housing-credit guarantees.
20 per cent — €2.4 billion: SMEs, productive enterprises, entrepreneurship and job creation.
10 per cent — €1.2 billion: schools, hospitals, vocational training and human capital.
5 per cent — €600 million: governance, digital monitoring, independent auditing and anti-corruption mechanisms.
This would ensure that European money does not disappear into recurrent expenditure but creates measurable economic assets.
Three Scenarios
The programme should not begin with a political target such as “return one million Syrians”.
It should begin with Syria’s economic absorption capacity.
Under a first pilot scenario, 100,000 voluntary returnees could be supported through a €2.4 billion investment programme.
Under a second scenario, the programme could expand to 250,000 returnees, supported by a cumulative €6 billion investment portfolio.
Under a five-year third scenario, 500,000 voluntary returnees could be supported through the full €12 billion fund.
This represents an average investment of approximately €24,000 per returnee.
But that figure must not be misunderstood.
The money would not simply be handed to individuals.
Most of it would remain in Syria in the form of rehabilitated homes, electricity networks, schools, businesses, water systems and employment opportunities.
And these assets would serve millions of Syrians who never left the country.
That principle is essential.
A Syrian returning from Europe should not receive public services and economic opportunities unavailable to the Syrian who remained in the country throughout the war.
The unit of investment should therefore be the community, not merely the returning refugee.
Return Must Not Become a Deportation Quota
The fund should rest on three principles:
voluntariness, dignity and sustainability.
European institutions themselves have repeatedly endorsed safe, dignified and voluntary return.
Financing should therefore never be conditioned on Damascus accepting a fixed number of deportees.
The correct performance indicator is not:
How many Syrians left Germany?
It is:
How many returnees were still living sustainably in Syria two years after returning?
That changes the logic of migration policy.
Success would be measured not at the airport departure gate in Europe, but two years later in the Syrian labour market.
A Performance Contract, Not Another Aid Fund
SERRF should operate on a payment-for-results model.
Every participating Syrian governorate or municipality should have publicly measurable targets:
homes rehabilitated;
sustainable jobs created;
additional hours of electricity;
households connected to water;
school places created;
business-registration times reduced;
businesses surviving after two years;
and the percentage of returnees remaining in their communities 24 months after returning.
Results should be published quarterly on an open digital platform.
The fund should be subject to independent Syrian-European auditing, with participation from institutions such as the European Investment Bank, the World Bank and internationally recognised audit firms.
Neither Damascus nor Brussels should control the fund alone.
What Does Europe Gain?
Europe would not be giving charity.
It would be investing in the stability of its southern neighbourhood.
Every sustainable job created in Aleppo, Homs or Damascus potentially reduces the economic pressure for another person to migrate.
Every rehabilitated home increases a family’s ability to return voluntarily.
Every successful Syrian business transforms a potential recipient of assistance into a producer, employer and taxpayer.
European companies could also participate in Syria’s reconstruction through transparent and competitive procurement, creating commercial opportunities in energy, infrastructure, construction, healthcare, transport and technology.
Europe therefore has an economic interest in Syria’s recovery, not merely a humanitarian obligation.
What Does Syria Gain?
Syria should not replace dependence on humanitarian assistance with a new dependence on European money.
Instead, it should use the return process to attract capital, technology, skills and members of its diaspora.
A Syrian returning from Germany may bring more than luggage.
He or she may bring professional qualifications, industrial experience, knowledge of European standards, language skills and business networks.
SERRF should therefore include a parallel programme:
Return with Skills.
Doctors, engineers, technicians, entrepreneurs and skilled workers could receive incentives linked not merely to residence in Syria, but to opening businesses, filling critical skills shortages and training other Syrians.
The objective should be to convert human return into human-capital investment.
Europe Faces an Economic Choice
The EU has already moved from sanctions towards economic engagement with Syria. Germany and Syria have placed migration, economic and financial recovery, and reconstruction within their emerging bilateral framework.
The political architecture therefore already exists.
What is missing is a financial instrument connecting these objectives.
Europe does not need to finance Syria’s entire $216 billion reconstruction bill.
It needs to demonstrate that a smaller, disciplined investment can create a virtuous cycle:
Investment → Infrastructure → Jobs → Voluntary Return → Production and Tax Revenue → Stability → Further Investment.
If designed properly, Syrian return need not become a political dispute between Damascus, Berlin and Brussels.
It could instead become the foundation of the most consequential Syrian-European economic partnership in decades.
The question European policymakers should therefore ask is not simply:
How much would rebuilding Syria cost Europe?
A better question is:
How much will it cost Europe if Syria remains unable to rebuild — and therefore unable to offer millions of its people a credible path home?
د.محمد محمدمظهر أحمد
